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This paper presents the basic elements of a heterarchic 
model of good governance and predicts its future trends. 
This model is already present in the military and in some 
companies, and can – without rejecting the hierarchic 
forms – enhance the range of communications without 
reducing supervision and accountability. On the contra-
ry, they are strengthened as a path is introduced to more 
transparent and democratic public institutions. The model 
also relates to the classic, hierarchic, big and legally-orient-
ed public administration, so changes will not be evident 
in a short period of time. Countries can enable public de-
liberation by transforming their public institutions into 
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heterarchic ones. A heterarchic administration can bring 
public decisions closer to the people who can – as their (in)
formal contributors – provide more relevant information 
and more predictable outcomes. 
Keywords: governance, heterarchy, Lego style of public ad-
ministration, visible public participation
1. Introduction
The constant search to improve public sector efficiency, from Scientific 
Management onwards, has raised ideas about the best organisational form 
that could achieve cohesion between the objectives and the most appro-
priate means without destroying the freedom of the people. Some of these 
forms have been: good bureaucracy, new public management, good ad-
ministration, administrative justice, governance, good governance, sound 
governance, e-governance, smart governance, meta-governance, the 
postmodern, post-welfare state, reinventing government, neo-Weberian, 
post-neoliberal government, etc. While these ideas strive to give the best 
recipe for the maximisation of public goals,1 they should all start from the 
same point: when dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature (and pow-
er is always reciprocal), it has to be viewed by all who are involved and/
or in its totality of relations. So long as public problems are not actively 
co-identified and/or co-defined by the people, government solutions will 
represent only an “anaesthetic” for the people, and normative processes 
will still take place mainly within the executive branch.2 Why can a citizen 
(as a client) – in some more developed countries – look up the shortest 
1  The term from the title of this paper “good governance” includes a variety of gener-
ally “good” things, while they do not necessarily fit together in any meaningful way; govern-
ance is “the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented 
(or not implemented) [while] good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participa-
tory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equi-
table and inclusive and follows the rule of law” (UNESCAP, 2009). How these or some oth-
er elements will fit together does not depend on them, but on a system that could establish 
their relations, recursions and connections.
2  E.g. in Slovenia, in the period 1992 – 2011 the Government of Slovenia submitted 
2783 draft laws, 2575 of which were later adopted as laws (92.52%), MPs submitted 807 
draft laws, 229 of which were later adopted as laws; voters (a minimum of 5000 citizens 
is needed for a legal initiative) submitted only six draft laws, only one of which was later 
adopted as law (Državni zbor 1992-2007; Poročilo o delu Državnega zbora 2008 – 2011). 
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service time to obtain a building permit or a driver’s license online, but 
cannot express her/his voice as a citizen? The higher educational levels 
achieved by the population in the EU-27,3 the higher UN education in-
dex worldwide,4 the decline of public trust in the government in 2012, the 
crisis of leadership and NGOs as the still most trusted institutions in 2013 
(Edelman Trust Barometer, 2013), indicate the need for change in the 
administration of public affairs. People have better knowledge and more 
information than ever before, and they trust the (usually less hierarchic) 
NGOs more than government institutions. As the UN notes, “progress 
has extended to expansions in people’s power to select leaders, influence 
public decisions and share knowledge” (UN, 2011: 23). It is time to give 
people not only a right to vote, but also to their voice. We need a new sys-
tematic oversight that can compare the activities of different public agen-
cies, private organisations and people; we need to put these activities into 
public decision-making.
This paper advocates active public participation – which is formally al-
ready present in democratic governments, but is mostly still not used on 
a daily basis. The classic form of representative democracy with elections 
every few years is by itself an inadequate way of managing state power 
and holding it to account (especially where decisions have far-reaching 
implications). A modern form of democracy must be  available to its users 
rather than to authorities: “Hitler and Stalin, Pinochet and Marcos—all 
held plebiscites when it suited them. The test of a new application of di-
rect democracy will be its automaticity, the extent to which it takes place 
not at the caprice of leaders, but of the people” (Fossedal, 2002: 265). If 
“the cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy” (Mencken, 2009: 
29), the cure for democratic deficit is also more democracy. We must 
There is no doubt that in other parliamentary democracies the prevalence of the executive 
is also present.
3  For the EU-27 as a whole, in 2010 just over one third (33.6 %) of 30- to 34-year-ol-
ds had completed tertiary education. These figures support the premise that the proportion 
of the population in the EU that has studied to a higher level has increased. This trend is in 
keeping with one of the Europe 2020 targets, namely, that by 2020 at least 40 % of persons 
aged 30 to 34 have attained a tertiary level education (Eurostat, 2012).
4  Most people today live longer, are better educated and have better access to goods 
and services than ever before. Even in economically distressed countries, people’s health and 
education have improved greatly (UN, 2011: 23). Our analysis of national trends in education 
inequality (measured by average years of schooling) since 1970 shows improvements in most 
countries. In contrast with trends in income inequality, education inequality has declined 
most in Europe and Central Asia (almost 76 percent), followed by East Asia and the Pacific 
(52 percent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (48 percent) (ibid: 29). 
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repeat it again and again because de facto it does not work, even though 
we have all the (e-)means we need. In doing so we could use a different 
approach: not by the goal of the idea but by its structure. Only a changed 
structure of participation can yield different content. Stafford said that 
“the tool for handling [the new world’s] complexity is organisation” (Staf-
ford, 1975: 15), but we have retained basically the same hierarchic form 
of government since the ancient times and hope to catch up with the rap-
idly changing environment with new elections, i.e. when “our” politicians 
will “certainly” change “everything”.
The organisation of public administration (PA) should therefore not only 
be more open to active public participation, but primarily more demo-
cratically assembled and/or structured; it should be more network-orient-
ed, because network-centric “operations…are characterised by informa-
tion-sharing across multiple levels of traditional echelons of command 
and control” (Wesensten et al., 2005: 194). This is the main idea of het-
erarchy (and of this paper), which we will try to put into the context of 
public participation that is already taking place mainly at informal levels 
(civil society, NGOs, political parties, economic groups, workshops, open 
houses, surveys). This kind of organisation can be moved from the infor-
mal sphere to real communication and cooperation – these words already 
contain the basic premise of “co” – between public officials and citizens. 
This organisational change and its advantage lies in its democratic and 
transparent element and in its introduction of simplicity into any kind of 
national apparatus without significant costs or major formal legal chang-
es. You might say that this is nothing new, that concepts of e-government 
and participation in PA and the vast body of literature on these concepts 
offer good insights, but again – why then do these good insights still and/
or mostly not work? The problem is surely not in technology – it is in our 
minds. It is the problem of the discrepancy between the theory (we know 
everything, but nothing really works) and practice (some things work, but 
we do not know why) of democratic decision-making. The problem of 
democratic public administration will be approached from the cybernetic 
point of view (Ashby, 2012; Beer, 1994; Beer, Eno, 2009), because it is 
mainly oriented towards an adaptive, sensitive, responsive and viable in-
stitutional model of social organisation.
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2.  In Search of a Different, but still 
Unifying Model
Bureaucracy existed as early as in Ancient Egypt, but the term was coined 
by De Gournay at the end of the 18th century. It was based on the mil-
itaristic elements of hierarchy, division of organisation and of labour. 
Specialisation enabled the creation of large complex units, as well as the 
expansion of production after the industrial revolution. These past bu-
reaucratic strengths can be today’s weaknesses: the big united bureaucra-
cy hinders the coordination of more complicated problems in the environ-
ment (global warming and consequential rising of the sea level, tornadoes, 
scarcity of natural resources…) and in society (incurable or mass disease, 
population ageing, global epidemics, higher inequality between citizens, 
unemployment, increasing poverty, migrations…). As a massive appara-
tus bureaucracy is resistant to change, but it is less flexible in the changing 
environment. Because of its specialisation it could also represent a bigger 
threat to the freedoms of the people. Hierarchy is a less absolute cure 
with the rise of complexity in the environment. While the bureaucratic 
need for the implementation of decisions will always exist, this cannot 
mean that there can be no changes to the way it is organised: changes can 
focus on the basic elements of bureaucracy, that is, a solid and permanent 
type of organisation and clear lines of command. These elements change 
when they are placed in the wider networks of other organisations (the 
UN, EU, OECD, WTO, federal states, etc.): they are therefore not as 
important as relations between these organisations are. Relations – and 
not organisations per se – maintain international peace and security, devel-
op friendly contacts between nations and promote social progress, better 
living standards and human rights, achieve economic and political union, 
promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being 
of people worldwide, ensure trade flows, guarantee the many intermedi-
ate governments etc. In states where hierarchy (the executive) became 
the major element of authoritarian government, this was accompanied 
by public upheavals, as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya can demonstrate. These 
upheavals show another very important fact: the African-Arab wave of 
protest was largely supported by digital communications that transferred 
information – almost or very close to real time – around the world.5
5  Digital platforms have also helped in the other parts of the world: “it took four 
months for the Chinese government to acknowledge the SARS outbreak and for the WHO 
to respond with a global alert, despite much earlier reporting by ordinary citizens in mil-
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Every successful integration can be achieved mainly by human minds, i.e. 
public values that are “more than a summation of individual preferences 
of the users or producers of public services collectively built through de-
liberation involving elected and appointed government officials and key 
stakeholders” (Stoker, 2006: 42). This summation can be different in each 
case, i.e. non-hierarchic: with regard to public values, in 1945 McCulloch 
– based on situation where A is preferred to B, B to C, but C is preferred 
to A – established that value hierarchies do not exist.6 The mapping of 
values can exist only by crossing over one (neural) circuit (over a syn-
apse) to another non-adjacent one, and thereby as its effect, leaving the 
map of values in prior situations, i.e. their position/value of values is not 
changed. This can be seen in every case when new preferences are given 
to different or even to the same values (in different contexts of time and 
place). The zigzag processes of determination of public values and public 
interest within as well as outside of rigid PA structures essentially create 
knowledge and information: there can be no decentralisation without cen-
tralisation, no autonomy without hierarchy, no hierarchy without heter-
archy, while they all are based on communication and coordination. We 
are still mainly the successors of Aristotle’s laws of thought, but (de)cen-
tralisation is neither a thing nor a notion: it can be both at the same time 
and in the same place. Power and knowledge can be present in hierarchy 
as in people. They can be sharable, du- and/or multiplicated. The Lego 
style of PA may be contrary to the present formal legal order, but as long 
people participate and see public benefits from this, they will also tolerate 
lions of cell phone and Internet messages and by the private ProMED-mail system” (Fung 
et al., 2007: 143). According to the Networked Readiness Index 2012 (Dutta and Bilbao-
Osorio, 2012: 12) the last ranking state with an advanced economy is the Slovak Republic, 
in the 64th place. It is also preceded by some of the states within CEE (Central and East-
ern Europe: Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Croatia, Montenegro, Poland and Turkey), CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia: Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, 
Azerbaijan and Mongolia), DEVASIA (developing Asia: Malaysia, China and Brunei Da-
russalam), LATAM (Latin America and the Caribbean: Barbados, Chile, Uruguay, Panama 
and Trinidad and Tobago) and MENA area (Middle East and North Africa: Bahrain, Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, Tunisia and Kuwait).
6  For him this value anomaly corresponds to circularity, which is “sufficient basis 
for categorical denial of the subsumption that values were magnitudes of any kind. Thus, 
for values there can be no common scale … Circularities in preference instead of indicating 
inconsistencies actually demonstrate consistency of a higher order … An organism pos-
sessed of this nervous system – is sufficiently endowed to be unpredictable from any theory 
founded on a scale of values. It has a heterarchy of values and is thus internectively too rich 
to submit to a summumbonum” (McCullogh, 1945: 92). Also, at voting, collective preferences 
can be cyclic (i.e. not transitive), even if the preferences of individual voters are not. McCul-
logh’s values are therefore similar to the voting paradox, also known as Condorcet’s paradox. 
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the more flexible, less concretised legal basis for this kind of organisation 
(see Locke’s argument for the people’s consent to prerogative).7 This kind 
of basis could still embrace the structure, function and process of deci-
sion-making and balance all particularities in one whole; it could unite 
them under (a) general, inclusive idea(s) without which – given contem-
porary complexity – there can be no uniform, common path. 
A higher, metadimension (denominator) is always needed if we want to 
understand a sub-system’s content more fully. What is preferable cannot 
be determined once and for all by any kind of formal organisation. The 
emergence of a decision depends on the concentration of relevant infor-
mation that changes from moment to moment, and not by any kind of 
pre-established rigid structure, but by a time-and-place dependent pur-
pose. There is a big difference between content and process; a step from 
“is” to “ought” should be enabled, while its content cannot be determined 
by any kind of science: “[l]iberalism is a doctrine about what the law ought 
to be, democracy a doctrine about the manner of determining what will be 
the law … while liberalism is one of those doctrines concerning the scope 
and purpose of government from which democracy has to choose, the 
latter, being a method, indicates nothing about the aims of government” 
(Hayek, 2011: 167–168).
Based on the discussion so far, we can already state some arguments: 1) 
the clear lines of command are and will still be needed in any new model; 
their clarity can be achieved if they focus on the five basic parts of any or-
ganisation (implementation, coordination, control, research and policy), 
with an emphasis on the recursive connections between these parts. Unity 
of command at the top (policy) is always needed to keep systems togeth-
er, while specialisation with the division of labour can be introduced at 
lower levels. Every organisation should consist of these five parts and can 
be simultaneously superior and/or subordinate to other organisations;8 2) 
a permanent type of organisation as one of the basic elements of bureau-
cracy should be changed into a more vivid “Lego style” of PA, where parts 
7  The people therefore, finding reason to be satisfied with these princes, whenever 
they acted without, or contrary to the letter of the law, acquiesced in what they did, and, 
without the least complaint, let them inlarge their prerogative as they pleased, judging righ-
tly, that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws, since they acted conformable 
to the foundation and end of all laws, the public good (Locke, 2010: 231).
8  Thus Simon’s proverbs of administration (1946) can also be set aside (administra-
tive efficiency is not reduced by a specialization of the task among the group, by arranging 
the members of the group in a determinate hierarchy of authority, or by limiting the span of 
control at any point in the hierarchy to a small number or by grouping the workers).
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can be appropriately connected in many ways for different tasks. This 
Lego style of PA will be achievable only if there is more real-time infor-
mation between the parts; 3) information essentially depends on relations 
and therefore on the network style of hub organisation that can connect 
the centre of the organisation with its parts and integrate these parts with 
the centre.
We are talking about a step or a process in structuring PA, while regard-
ing the content of “ought” (people’s wishes, interests, morality, ethics) 
nothing can be said scientifically (in a way that “something specific, good 
or bad, will happen in a specific place and time in the world”). Only dem-
ocratic partnerships can establish a higher legitimacy and they should be 
given an appropriate democratic structure. We should not forget that: 
“before and after markets there was and will be life thanks to social in-
stitutions that pre-date market systems by thousands of years and have 
demonstrated far greater resilience during times of scarcity” (Commu-
nity Action Partnership, 2011: 9). Public participation can be enhanced 
without any kind of ex ante formalisms; it only has to be visible. This is its 
“beauty”, its advantage over more formal and/or hierarchic solutions. 
3.  Management of Complexity by the Heterarchic 
Model of Public Administration
While we have so far made the foundation for the establishment of effec-
tive participation with some basic rules (arguments), we will try to show 
a way how the management of complexity and of PA can be put in a new 
frame that would still consist of a set of interrelated parts. Because there 
are many known and still unknown parts and/or connections that (can) in-
fluence the operations of PA, we can talk about complexity and about PA 
as a system. Information emerges on different levels and does not depend 
only on PA – it is “independent”. We must therefore look for relevant in-
formation where this information is – not for an organisation to make our 
decisions resistant or flexible to change. Similar “information retrieval” 
processes operate constantly in our brains (if we want some information 
on when we were 10 years old, we just have to retrieve it from our memo-
ry), so we will again go to McCulloch (one of the founders of cybernetics), 
who in 1945, while studying an apparent inconsistency of preference of 
values, came to the conclusion that the brain must have a “heterarchic 
organisation as a neuron network which is specifically equipped for par-
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allel processing of information” (1945: 90).9 A network is a concept of 
coordination; it is determined by organic or informal social systems in 
contrast with bureaucratic structures and their formal interrelations. They 
all can be built by wider public cooperation and participation. Complex-
ity cannot be managed within the existing bureaucracy alone – there are 
many forms of state activities and market failures, which cannot be ad-
dressed by existing solutions.10 “In order to compensate for the limitations 
and failures of both state regulation and market regulation, new forms 
of negotiated governance through the formation of public–private part-
nerships, strategic alliances, dialogue groups, consultative committees 
and inter-organisational networks have mushroomed” (Sørensen, Torfing, 
2007: 2), but if we want for these networks to be successful, we should 
focus more explicitly on the structures of discourse, power and their visible 
interactions.
3.1. The Basic Elements of the Heterarchic System
If self-organisation and selection are the main laws of complexity (Kauf-
mann, 1996: 6) it means that the world around us is constantly self-organ-
ised, whether we like it or not.11 PAs should do the same with a combi-
nation of competences, data and processes giving people a better voice. 
Administration can be less hierarchic and it can acquire its authority from 
knowledge, more from lex artis than from lex Ceasaris. This heterarchic 
system, known as the Network-Centric System (NCS), operates in the 
army under the name of “Network Centric Warfare”,12 which means 
9  And some information which has been stored in the minds of readers since the age 
of 10 is the result of the heterarchic organisation of our brains.
10  Compexity can be shown on a very simple case of a statute that would have only 
four measures of acchieving a goal. The number of their states  is 12, and the 
number of connections between means  is 6; the input variety ( ) would already 
enable 16 possibilities (42=16), while the output variety ( ) would enable 264 or 
exactly 18446744073709551616 possibilities. We cannot avoid this, but we can put more 
variety (more transparency, data, mutual connections and control) into a more balanced 
implementation of the law.
11  The United States Prohibition of Alcohol (1920–1933) and other laws that have 
caused unintended consequences (the so-called Peltzman effect and perverse effects of re-
gulation) are such examples. Self-regulation can be seen in every car accident where traffic 
is self-regulated in one way or another.
12  “The NCW is an information superiority-enabled concept of operations that ge-
nerates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision-makers, and shooters to 
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“computer network-based provision of an integrated picture of the battle-
field, available in detail to all levels of command and control down to the 
individual soldier” (Wesensten et al., 2005: 94) and “translates informa-
tion superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable 
entities in the battle space” (Alberts et al., 2000: 2). It is the techno-
logically enhanced vision that was present in the ancient generals who 
watched troops on a battlefield from a nearby hill. This system balances 
between the bottom-up initiatives and top-down directives; it seeks solu-
tions within different levels and combines them differently for different 
tasks. The heterarchic model (HM) is a process in which different com-
petences and levels, more data, widespread communication, cooperation 
and coordination are arranged in such a way as to extract optimal memory 
(data storage) and information-processing capacity from them, without 
sacrificing the centrality of command. It means a better  awareness of all 
possibilities because we pay attention to all the stakeholders’ (groups, 
people, civil organisations, public institutions) opinions and initiatives. 
It is not about the formal competences and/or organisations per se, but 
about the processes that should be organised around data that could give 
crucial information. The HM preserves hierarchy (in the name of integra-
tion and unity), while connections are closer, more tightly interwined and 
goal-oriented. It is not important who has information, but what kind of 
information s/he has. Politics and administration retain the competences 
to make key decisions, while information, good practices and suggestions 
should not be judged by their source, but by content and according to cri-
teria. The HM can be a different name for Provan and Kenis’s “Network 
Administrative organization” (NAO). This is “a separate administrative 
entity set up specifically to govern the network and its activities” (2007: 
236) for which they –comparing participant-governed networks (with no 
separate and unique governance entity) and lead-organisation-governed 
networks (a single powerful buyer/supplier/contractor and smaller buyer/
supplier/subcontractor firms, as well as the corporate governance model 
of Japanese Keiretsu) – concluded that “an NAO mode of governance is 
likely to provide a greater balance … regarding the tension between the 
need for efficient operation and inclusive decision-making … evolution is 
much more likely to move from a lead organization form to an NAO, than 
achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater 
lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronisation. In essence, the NCW 
translates information superi ority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable 
entities in the battlespace.” (Wesensten et al., 2005: 94)
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from lead organization to shared governance” (Ibid: 242, 247). The HM 
can also allow less specific rules without higher costs by a different kind of 
organisation: if there is wider deliberation, better (more easily agreed on 
and more efficient) decisions – closer to Coase’s theorem (1960)13 – can 
occur. If parties cooperate, they will usually – if there are minor transac-
tion costs – achieve a more efficient result regardless of the formal law. 
Although  “[l]aws that are less specific, impose greater implementation 
and decision-making costs by judicial and administrative bodies” (Parisi, 
Fon, 2010: 11), the NCS can gain faster and more accurate information 
from different places and persons, so decisions can be made more easily 
and accurately. 
What prevents governments from placing relevant questions online and 
based on the citizens’ answers really14 adjust their operations? The HM 
can accommodate more quickly to new conditions, with less strain on 
legal processes (of course and again – if we really want this to happen). 
It also enables networks at lower levels; this kind of example is found in 
the co- and self- regulation of industry, local self-government, universities, 
civil society organisations etc. The forms and rules can, due to the HM’s 
wider overall overview of operations by every actor and decision-mak-
ing organisation, be based on more general and/or simpler15 rules and 
standards where the field is new, is developing new forms and elements 
or where the field should be more stable, because of the HM’s overall 
non-interference (e.g. university autonomy). The HM has a lot of poten-
tial that also works in its rudimentary form in the PA (in the independent 
agencies). The HM can combine the benefits of the state officials’ exper-
tise with the creativity of the people; with the development of information 
technology all stakeholders can give a faster and more accurate result. The 
13  The theorem states that if trade in an externality is possible and there are no tran-
saction costs, bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation 
of property rights.
14  Governments have in recent years (decades) increasingly opened up their work to 
the public and have offered citizens more opportunities to express their opinions; also public 
consultations are a legal obligation in many European countries. However, it is not about 
talking the talk, but walking the walk: countries must also really act in a way that reflects the 
things they say. 
15   Epstein suggests that in a complex world, simple rules should be used: “under 
the dominant constraint of scarcity, insist that every new legal wrinkle pay its way by some 
improvement in the allocation of social resources... The upshot is the simple rules: individual 
autonomy, first possession, voluntary exchange, control of aggression, limited privileges for 
cases of necessity, and just compensation for takings of private property, with a reluctant 
nod toward redistribution within the framework of flat taxes” (1995: 307).
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HM is a mixed structure, although mutual relations are not strictly reg-
ulated; they are activated and independently regulated in individual situ-
ations. Main matters that raise and lower nods are their own capabilities 
and mostly their knowledge. There are only a few superior/subordinate 
relations; everyone can be included with the same rights and obligations, 
towards common goals in the lower hierarchic structures. The HM model 
is not only an experiment to replace the formal structure with an informal 
one, but the means whereby (prior) informal relations can be (half)-for-
malised, and made part of an adaptive structure. Its goal is to re-establish 
order and cooperation without sacrificing corporate initiative, function 
and integration.
Organisations and citizens should still be connected to the centre if we 
want the relevant public goals. For Goodsell bureaucracy cannot be sup-
ported by some “mega-institution, but by thousands of separate organi-
zations” (1994: 4), while for Hayek “an order involving an adjustment to 
circumstances, knowledge of which is dispersed among a great many peo-
ple, cannot be established by central direction” (2011: 230). Prima facie 
it seems that Goodsell and Hayek are against bureaucracy, but this is not 
the case: for the former bureaucracy should be supported by thousands of 
separate organisations, while the latter is a) wrong regarding the possibil-
ity of the administration of knowledge (by making decisions on who gets 
what, how, in what way, for how long, etc.) and its distillation (by pre-
dictive analytics) from a central direction; and b) right regarding the fact 
that the central direction cannot establish knowledge per se, i.e. without 
collecting data from people. If we keep the centre (because of the much 
needed coordination and integration) and add citizens, we get e countless 
nodes and hubs within many fields, with a (formal) coordinator at the cen-
tre, and with many separate units that operate within a specific field. In 
the latter case, intertwined connections with others are established in de-
pendence on assignments. If connections were made visible to everyone 
through the proposed solutions based on the criteria or formulae stated in 
advance, the basic cybernetic law of redundancy of command (Beer, Eno, 
2009) is established: authority does not lie in the chains of command, but 
in the relevance of the information; if there is enough information there is 
no need for hierarchy to (rationally) tell the people what is right or wrong. 
It takes only one case of problem-solving to show many active connec-
tions that are presented in the form of a tower or a lighthouse:
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Figure 1: The HM model of governance – enhancing variety of subordi-
nate interactions
Source: author’s own construction
A certain level of supervision of this “sea of connections” can be achieved 
by the mutual connections of participants at multiple levels, with commu-
nications going in both directions. Organisational diagrams with a hie-
rarchic structure can never show the real processes that shape organisa-
tions and their environment. Before the use of computer technology, the 
nearest similar method for conveying employee suggestions to superiors 
was the Japanese system of ringi-sho.16 Hyperconnectivity in real time and 
16  A ringi-sho is a written proposal that is submitted horizontally to one's peers within 
middle management levels, within one's depertment, and across divisional and departmental 
lines. The document is a proposal for action; it details the background of a problem, and 
describes how to solve the problem. The ringisho is shown to anyone whose work might be 
involved in the plan of action. Each relevant person studies the plan and accepts or rejects it 
to one degree or another … A ringhisho is amended and shown again and again until either 
agreement is reached, or too many managers “forget” to sign the proposal. If accepted, the 
ringisho is then presented to the originator's superior and the document travels up the chain 
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place can improve not only the efficiency of PA, but also the freedom of 
the people, and the levels of democracy, transparency and accountabi-
lity: “the same digital tools that make employee empowerment possible 
also provide the means to monitor those employees’ performance” (Gol-
dsmith, Crawford, 2014: 109). PAs are still – and will internally remain – 
hierarchic organisations but external processes are de facto not only linear 
and hierarchic – they are also horizontal, contradictory, heterarchic and 
circular. And these external processes could be incorporated into the PA.
3.2. Self-Synchronisation in Practice of the Heterarchic 
System
Self-regulation and co-regulation are common forms in the heterarchic 
model; in this model people cannot be used only to pass information to 
the centre but also to each other. Self-synchronisation is consistent with 
the natural “flocking algorithm” in which a flock of birds in flight “is based 
on an autonomous programme to a) steer to avoid crowding, b) steer 
toward the average heading of local flock mates, and c) steer to move 
toward the average position of local flock mates. Thus, one’s movement 
makes use of information regarding the location, speed, and direction 
of the three or four local flock mates” (Wesensten et al., 2005: 96). Sig-
nalling behaviour can be seen in our daily lives, where we follow rules as 
long as other people follow them too. Self-synchronisation can also be 
spotted in the compliance of firms with the European Union energy label. 
This refers to the public evaluation by visible letter grades (A, B, C, D) 
that can be added to a government website in relation to public actions, 
public officials, economy and citizens.17 Self-synchronisation in response 
to the actions of others can establish rational decisions even if there are 
no personal experiences in the field in question. This system is present in 
“innovative companies like Wall-Mart, Dell, Amazon, EBay and UP… 
[where] firms partner in value networks [and supports] have an integrat-
ed collaboration of specialist companies, each providing complementary 
intermediate goods and services” (Gurnaxani, Plice, 2004: 3). 
17  In 1997, for example, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors adopted an 
ordinance that requires restaurants to post highly visible letter grades (A, B, C) on their 
front windows that are based on the results of County Department of Health Services in-
spections. […] Studies estimate that hospitalizations from foodborne illnesses have decrea-
sed from 20% to 13% (Fung, Weil, 2010: 110). 
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Self-organisation in biology is to Kaufmann “the root source of order” 
(1995) and it is also known in chaos theory. The concept of amoeba or-
ganisation was first introduced in the W. L. Gore & Associates Company 
in 1958. The founder Wilbert L. (Bill) Gore founded a company based 
on strict decentralisation, self-organising groups, shallow hierarchy, and 
the concept of chaos in an organisation. The company is among just five 
workplaces to appear on every list of the 100 Best Companies to Work For 
since the rankings debuted three decades ago (Google as one of the rep-
resentatives of network organisation is in the first place).18
Practical approximations to the HM can also be seen in the combined 
powers of police, customs and immigration officers in coordination with 
the tax authorities and national prosecutors. Another existing model, 
close to the heterarchic one, is cloud computing, which we use for pri-
vate purposes (e.g. Yahoo e-mail, Gmail, Hotmail, Dropbox, SkyDrive), 
or for voting as citizens, such as the Swiss Smartvote and the US VoteS-
mart. There are IT applications that group a wide range of local data to 
provide a picture of life and services in a particular area (e.g. AppsDC, 
DataGov, GovTrack, MAPLight, OpenSecrets, WashingtonWatch, Fol-
lowTheMoney, iLiveAt, FixMyStreet, MyBikelane).19 Some cities already 
have positive feedback by using ICT in the daily work of their public ser-
vices (Challenge.gov, Citizens Connect, Grade.DC.gov, Smart Chicago, 
596acres.org, CompStat system, etc.). There are many applications (more 
than 5,000) that allow citizens to replace some functions of government, 
in a self-service analogue to Craigslist, which can be found at e.g. Pro-
grammableWeb API. Noveck tells the story of Peer-to-Patent, where the 
Patent Office has integrated a volunteer network of self-selecting scien-
tists and technologists into the formerly closed and secretive patent ex-
amination process. Other practical examples are in “the core idea of Wiki 
Government…connecting the power of many to the work of the few in 
government” (Noveck, 2009: 14). Tapscott and Williams (2008) explore 
how some companies in the early 21st century used mass collaboration 
and open-source technology to be successful. Their main idea, known as 
wikinomics, is that customers are also co-innovators (“prosumers”) rather 
than simply consuming the end product. Tapscott and Williams think that 
“[e]ven governments can get involved, by using the new digital collabora-
18  CNN Money, 100 Best Companies to Work For http://money.cnn.com/magazi-
nes/fortune/best-companies/2012/full_list/ 
19  These examples could be placed in Provan and Kenis’s lead organization-governed 
networks.
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tion tools to transform public service delivery and engage their citizens in 
policy making” (2008: 314). 
Noveck’s idea can be spotted as early on as in the “democratic experimen-
talism” of Dorf and Sabel (1998), where they name a system of collabora-
tion “learning by monitoring”20, and is also found in Articles 37 and 72 of 
the French Constitution. A similar, practical, functional example of pub-
lic deliberation with public authority is also the Swedish local federation; 
the County administrative board – the government agency that represents 
the Riksdag and Government in the county and seeks that the decisions 
taken at the central level have the best possible effects in that county and 
serve the best interests of the residents – can be grouped with a munici-
pality. The local federation binds the central and the local level on coun-
ty territory.21 Members and alternates of the decision-making assembly 
are elected, as indicated in the federation statutes by the assemblies of 
the federation members. The municipality and the Government agree by 
contract which central legislation will or will not be applied for a certain 
period of time. These “free commune experiments” (FCE) (Baldersheim, 
Stahlberg, 1994) are taking place in France (the Swedish County admin-
istrative board is similar to the institution of prefect in France), Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway and Finland. They want to devolve greater responsibil-
ity for policy-making and service provision to the local level, with the aim 
of securing more responsive and cost-effective local services with the prior 
consent of the central government. 
20  The model requires linked systems of local and inter-local or federal pooling of 
information, each applying in its sphere the principles of benchmarking, simultaneous en-
gineering, and error correction, so that actors scrutinise their initial understandings of pro-
blems and feasible solutions. These principles enable the actors to learn from one another’s 
successes and failures while reducing the vulnerability created by the decentralised search 
for solutions. The system in which citizens in each locale participate directly in determining 
and assessing the utility of the services local governments provide, with the possibility of 
comparing the performance of their jurisdictions to the performance of similar settings, is 
called directly deliberative polyarchy (Dorf and Sabel, 1998: 287–288).
21  See Local Government Act (1991), Sections 20 to 29; municipalities and county 
councils may form local federations and transfer to such federations the management of 
local government concerns. A local federation is formed when the federation statutes have 
been adopted by the members of the federation or at a subsequent point in time indicated 
in the federation statutes. 
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3.3.  Human Leadership and Judgment as sine qua non 
of the Heterarchic System
Systems that collect, analyse, predict and share information push public 
agencies to focus on results rather than bureaucratic compliance. Using 
data to improve the services they provide is a necessary step to measure 
agencies’ performance and to hold them accountable for results. Although 
Goldsmith and Crawford see opportunity in digital technology (in the 
new ways of gathering, storing, and analysing data, in the new modes of 
communication and the new world of social networks that is established 
by this platform), they are aware that changes come from leaders who have 
forced changes by capitalising on the power of the new tools:
Cities can empower, engage, and enable both public employees and cit-
izens. Enhanced by digital technology, these cities will change the way 
citizens view local government and civic life itself. But this revolution, 
like any other, needs to respect its inheritance and preserve the strengths 
of earlier forms of urban government: human leadership and judgment. 
After all, this digital revolution is not being fought for the sake of apps and 
tablets. It will succeed, and transform civic life for the better, by making 
it once again of the people, for the people, and by the people (Goldsmith, 
Crawford, 2014: 177).
There are positive results that can be the HM’s reference point: if ICT 
contributed to the globalisation of markets (e.g. with eBay, Amazon, eB-
ooks, Google, PayPal, Wall Street Stock Exchange), it could also contrib-
ute to the globalisation of democracy, but we should first build all the 
necessary steps. How can the heterarchic idea be achieved in reality, in 
the daily operations of PA? We think that we should start with the human 
leadership, our judgments and/or decisions. No positive change will work 
if there are no positively-oriented people; enlightening people with new 
possibilities of implementing old values is one of the tasks of the public 
sector. “Unless the people improve their understanding of complex public 
affairs, democracies will therefore either become more of a fiction, or 
democracies will increasingly fail in their more demanding tasks, includ-
ing “weaving the future”. Upgrading the understanding of complex public 
affairs by larger parts of populations is therefore essential for empowering 
them for the better rather than the worse” (Dror, 2002: 106). The HM 
is an all-encompassing model in which people and their information are 
of the highest importance, without sacrificing the need for central coor-
dination and decision-making. New institutional arrangements should be 
preceded first by the changes in our thinking; the HM should first be only 
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an informal process in which we can change the perspective from a person 
to the information that s/he delivers. 
3.4. Calculable Self-Synchronisation in Practice
The remodelling of PA operations by introducing the HM can be sup-
ported by ICT. PAs still use ICT more as a substitute for the typewriter 
than for real, intelligent data analysis. The HM based on computerised 
networks of gathering information can be a major improvement. Govern-
ments can start decision-making that would be closer to the people using 
a range of survey applications (e.g. SurveyMonkey, Floq, FreeOnlineSur-
veys, Kwik Surveys) that can provide statistically more unbiased answers 
to solve current problems. Information gained by the proposed model can 
give us better public decisions pre-based on prediction formulas, such as 
multiple regression, regression coefficients, discriminant analysis, actuari-
al tables, computer programs, algorithms and other similar schemes.
Order for free. Kauffman has demonstrated by the laws of complexity that 
“democracy has evolved as the optimal mechanism to achieve the best 
attainable compromises among conflicting practical, political, and moral 
interests” (1996: 4). He thinks that life is not to be found in the beauty of 
Watson-Crick pairing, but is based on some form of collective autocatal-
ysis (1996, 2002, 2010) that is too complex to be discussed here (due to 
the space limitations), but we will nevertheless mention his order for free, or 
his idea for spontaneous (natural) order that exhibits itself in life as a con-
sequence of autocatalytic reactions or the collective dynamics network. 
In 1965 he programmed the N = 100 gene network (now known as the 
Kauffman/Boolean network), with each gene receiving K = 2 randomly 
chosen inputs from among 100. Such a network has 2100 states. “It turned 
out from numerical evidence that the median number of states on a state 
cycle was the square root of N … Self-organisation that confines patterns 
of model gene activities to tiny regions of the network’s state space arises 
spontaneously in these networks. There is order for free” (2010: 110).22
22  Astonishingly, “order for free,” much like real biology, does exist in random-model 
genetic light-bulb networks. This is emergent self-organisation, not reducible to physics. The 
name for such a network is random Boolean network, because the rules governing the on/
off behavior of any regulated gene as its regulatory inputs vary from off to on is given by a 
logical or Boolean function (Kauffman, 2010: 106).
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The order arises, sudden and stunning, in K = 2 networks. For these 
well-behaved networks, the length of state cycles is not the square root 
of the number of states, but, roughly, the square root of the number of 
binary variables… Think of a randomly constructed Boolean network with 
N = 100,000 lightbulbs, each receiving K = 2 inputs … The system has 
2100,000 megaparsecs of possibilities – and what happens? The massive net-
work quickly and meekly settles down and cycles among the square root 
of 100,000 states, a mere 317. At a millionth of a second per state transi-
tion, a network, randomly assembled, unguided by any intelligence, would 
cycle through its attractor in 317-millionths of a second (Kauffman, 1996: 
44).
Only two parameters suffice to govern whether random Boolean lightbulb 
networks are ordered or chaotic; this binary network could be paired with 
the binary nature of law (legal v. illegal; enacted v. non-enacted). If every 
sparsely connected network could exhibit internal order by the square 
root of N, this could also have enormous consequences for the law: public 
participation by survey could give very good answers to major topics at the 
national level simply by using the square root of the number of citizens 
(e.g. for a nation with 2 and/or 10 million voters, their opinions would be 
fully relevant with as few as 1414 and/or 3162 votes). The case could be 
similar with regulatory instruments: if a statute proposed 10 measures to 
achieve goals, merely 3 of them would be effective – this says something 
about the constant monitoring and evaluation of instruments. These are 
the ways valuable information could be provided to hierarchic institutions 
for further work in the sense of an e-consultative referendum. The idea of 
bringing the citizen-centric e-business model into government operations 
can be a creative approach, adjusted to the specifics of the public sector. 
Using a larger amount of data and predictive analytics we can predict 
better public decisions for the challenges of the future.
Bayes’s Rule. After we get the relevant number of votes, we (or a state) 
could follow the majority opinion as in the case of a classic non-obligato-
ry referendum or even – in uncertain cases – estimate the probability of 
events taking into account the votes and known evidence. Along with data 
mining, multiple regression analysis and other statistical techniques that 
operate using known data, there is also a technique which encompasses 
what we intuitively disregard most of the time in our decision-making. We 
are talking about the one of the most famous formulae in mathematics, 
but the least used in public administration, i.e. the Bayes rule (known also 
as the Bayes theorem and/or formula) which relates current probability 
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to prior probability. It is the fundamental principle of normative deci-
sion-making that clashes with human intuition and its mistakes. 
People are mostly poor statisticians; one of the commonest errors is the 
neglect of the base rate (which leads to a focus only on new evidence 
in decision-making). This mistake can lead to large exaggerations of the 
probability of an event. If we want to express our decision even more 
rationally, we could use the Bayes rule as a method for decision-making 
based on the determination of a greater or lesser probability in cases of 
uncertainty; it tells us how our theories or hypotheses and logical premis-
es can be more probable, not merely possible. Bayes’s rule specifies how 
one ought to update one’s beliefs based on evidence where available, and 
in the absence of such evidence how probabilities are changed between 
basic alternatives. The probability – in the case of two not independent 
events – of event B following event A, is the probability of A multiplied 
by the probability that A and B both occur: P (A and B) = P(A) x P(B|A) 
= P(B) x P(A|B). The latter, i.e. the probability that A will occur, given 
that B has occurred, as the probability of A multiplied by B given that A 
is true divided by the probability of B, is known as Bayes's rule: P(A|B) = 
. Bayes’s rule presented in diachronic (changed over a period 
of time) interpretation is: 
P means probability, (H) hypothesis, the sign (|) means given, (E) ev-
idence, and the sign (~) means false. Because P(E) indicates exclusive 
and exhaustive events it includes the probability of event H itself and 
its complement (~H). “Bayes’s Theorem is a logical formula that deals 
with cases of empirical ambiguity, calculating how confident we can be 
in any particular conclusion, given what we know at the time” (Carri-
er, 2012: 80). Carrier also presented Bayes’s rule descriptively (Carrier, 
2012: 90):
P(H|E)= 
P(H)  x P(E│H) 
 P(H) x P(E│H) + P(~H) x P(E|~H) 
the prior probability, is the initial degree of personal belief in H  
the conditional probability is the degree of belief in E,  
given that the proposition H is true. 
the posterior probability, is 
the probability for H after 
taking into account E for 
and against H. 
the corresponding  
probability of the initial  
degree of belief against H 
the conditional probability as  
the degree of belief in E, given that 
the proposition H is false 
P(E);  
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Bayes's rule focuses on the logical relations between evidence and con-
clusions; it is not essential that these relations have a precise number, 
but rather to serve as a check i.e. to see if subjectively (intuitively) based 
hypotheses – based on particular bodies of evidence – are likely, almost 
certain, or impossible.
4. Conclusion
Despite numerous ideas about the “new” administration, most of the au-
thoritative-exclusive tasks of the government (public policy process) are 
still in the hands of a bureaucratic (agency-centric) type of organisation; 
the latter should not be an obstacle to another style of organisation, but 
rather its essential part. Government transformation is a necessary step to 
create fertile conditions for incorporation – with necessary adjustments23 
– of existent e-business into e-government models. The management of 
complexity in an uncertain world within the HM and its assessment tools 
can be better because of the constant interaction between the different 
interests and/or desires with their environment. With its interaction, 
self-organisation, regulation, coordination and control the HM is similar 
to Beer’s Viable System Model (Beer, 1972; Espejo, Reyes, 2011) and 
follows Ashby’s law of requisite variety24 more than the Weberian bureau-
cratic model. 
In the end each model depends on politics. Along with the emerging prac-
tices and the given economic position, the answer about the future organ-
23  Nguyen and Obi propose a value chain approach in which commercialisation (the 
involvement of the private sector in e-government initiative implementation) and speciali-
sation (in a single or group of public services) are the first step to integration of e-business 
models into e-government applications (2009: 10–11). 
24  Ashby's law simply states that only “variety can destroy variety” (1956: 207). On 
this basis in Slovenia some initiatives have been taken to modernise local democracy (see 
Pečarič, 2013).
930
Pečarič, Mirko (2015) A Heterarchic Model of Good Governance ...







isational model in the PA should be obvious. The NCS model is an open 
communication forum with information interplay from several sides and 
at several levels. With a common purpose, participation, soft boundaries 
and crossings of information it can be a suitable model to enhance the 
levels of democracy in policy processes and public services. Experience 
favours simple solutions; we should try to encourage people to engage 
in spontaneous communication by simplifying a formal organisation, but 
with formal protection. As within systems theory or cybernetics, it is all 
about the constant flux of information. It is not enough if the higher level 
does not act in response to the given information; the same problem can 
occur within the HM, but it is at least publicly known in the actual time 
during which a process takes place. It is necessary to realise the impor-
tance of such information to the success and efficiency of our (team)
work. The network organisation has been operating within us for millions 
of years. While our bodies consider information automatically, the for-
mal form, content and, most of all, the willingness of the people will be 
much needed in our organisations. Ought-questions – what should we 
do? – are always hard to solve. It is better to have quick access to a lot of 
relevant public information than a mix of governmental guessing with the 
non-transparent influences of lobbies or other pressure groups. 
References
Alberts, D. S., J. J. Garstka, F. P. Stein (2000) Network Centric Warfare: Deve-
loping and Leveraging Information Superiority (2nd edn.). Washington: CPR 
Publication Series
Alston, J. P., I. Takei (2005) Japanese Business Culture and Practices: A Guide to 
Twenty-First Century Japanese Business. Lincoln: iUniverse
Ashby, R. W. (1956) An Introduction to Cybernetics. Chapman & Hall: London
Baldersheim, H., K. Stahlberg (1994) Towards the Self-Regulating Municipality: 
Free Communes and Administrative Modernization in Scandinavia. Alders-
hot: Dartmouth publications
Beer, S. (1972) Brain of the Firm. New York: John Wiley & Sons
Beer, S. (1975) Platform for Change. London: John Wiley & Sons
Beer, S. (1994) Beyond Dispute: The Invention of Team Syntegrity. Chichester, 
New York: Wiley
Beer, S., B. Eno (2009) Think Before You Think: Social Complexity and Knowled-
ge of Knowing. New York: Wavestone Press
Carrier, R. (2012) Proving History: Bayes’s Theorem and the Quest for the Histo-
rical Jesus. First Edition. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books
931
Pečarič, Mirko (2015) A Heterarchic Model of Good Governance ...


























Coase, R. (1960) The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3: 
1–44
Community Action Partnership (2011) Facing the New Reality: Preparing Poor 
America for Harder Times Ahead, available at: http://www.managingmymo-
ney.com/NewRealities/FACING-reality.pdf (March 14, 2014)
Dorf, M. C., C. F. Sabel (1998) A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism. 
Columbia Law Review 98: 267–473
Dror, Y. (2002) The Capacity to Govern. Frank Cass: London
Dutta, S., B. Bilbao-Osorio (2012) The Global Information Technology Report 
2012: Living in a Hyperconnected World. World Economic Forum: Geneva
Edelman Trust Barometer (2013) Annual Global Survey, http://www.slideshare.
net/EdelmanInsights/global-deck-2013-edelman-trust-barometer-16086761 
(May 15, 2014)
Epstein, R. A. (1995) Simple Rules for a Complex World. Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge
Eurostat (2012) Education Statistics at Regional Level. European Commission: 
Brusells
Espejo, R., A. Reyes (2011) Organizational Systems Managing Complexity with 
the Viable System Model. Springer: Verlag
Fossedal, G. A. (2002) Direct Democracy in Switzerland. London: Transaction 
Publishers
Fung, A., M. Graham, D. Weil (2007) Full Disclosure. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press
Fung, A., D. Weil (2010) Open Government and Open Society. In: D. Lathrop, 
L. Ruma (eds) Open Government: Collaboration, Transparency, and Partici-
pation in Practice. Sebastopol: O’Reilly Media
Goldsmith, S., S. Crawford (2014) The Responsive City: Engaging Communities 
Through Data-Smart Governance. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass
Goodsell, C. T. (1994) The Case for Bureaucracy. Chatham House Publishers: 
New Jersey
Gurbaxani, V., R. Plice (2004) A Model of Network-Centric Organizations. The 
Crito Consortium, http://crito.uci.edu/papers/2004/AModelOfNetwork.pdf 
(October 2, 2014) 
Hayek, F. A. (1998) Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge
Hayek, F. A. (2011) The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition. Chica-
go: The University of Chicago Press
Kauffman, S. (1996) At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-
Organization and Complexity. Reprint edition. New York: Oxford University 
Press
Kauffman, S. (2002) Investigations. Oxford University Press
Kauffman, S. (2010) Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason, 
and Religion. Basic Books
932
Pečarič, Mirko (2015) A Heterarchic Model of Good Governance ...







Locke, J. (2010 Dve razpravi o oblasti. Ljubljana: Krtin
McCulloch, W. S. (1945) A Heterarchy of Values Determined by the Topology of 
Nervous Nets. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics 7: 89–93
Mencken, H. L. (2009) Notes on Democracy. New York: Dissident Books
Nguyen, H. T., T. Obi (2009) Government Transformation: The First Step to 
Integrate E-Business into E-Government. In: S. Chhabra, L. B. Shastri (eds) 
Integrating E-Business Models for Government Solutions: Citizen-Centric 
Service Oriented Methodologies and Processes. Information Science Refe-
rence: Hershey
Noveck, B. S. (2009) Wiki Government. How Technology Can Make Government 
Better, Democracy Stronger, and Citizens More Powerful. Brookings Institu-
tion Press: Washington
Državni zbor 1992 – 2007 (2007) Državni zbor RS: Ljubljana
Pečarič, M. (2013) Some Initiatives for Modernization of Local Democracy. Lex 
localis 11(3): 271-291
Poročilo o delu Državnega zbora v mandatnem obdobju 2008 – 2011 (2011) Dr-
žavni zbor RS: Ljubljana
Parisi, F., V. Fon (2010) The Economics of Law Making. Oxford University Press: 
New York
Provan, K. G., P. Kenis (2007) Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Ma-
nagement, and Effectiveness. JPART 18: 229-252
Simon, H. A. (1946) The Proverbs of Administration. Public Administration Re-
view 6: 53–67
Sørensen, E., J. Torfing (2007) Theories of Democratic Network Governance. 
McMillan: London
Tapscott, D., A. D. Williams (2008) Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Chan-
ges Everything. New York: Portfolio
UNESCAP (2009) What is Good Governance? http://www.unescap.org/resour-
ces/what-good-governance 
United Nations (2011) Human Development Report 2011. New York: United 
Nations
Wesensten, N. J., G. Belenky, T. J. Balkin (2005) Cognitive Readiness in Network-
Centric Operations. Parameters 35: 94–105
933
Pečarič, Mirko (2015) A Heterarchic Model of Good Governance ...


























A HETERARCHIC MODEL OF GOOD GOVERNANCE: 
A UNIFYING HUB FOR ADAPTABILITY, DIFFERENCES, 
SIMILARITIES, DEMOCRACY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Summary
The paper presents the basic elements of a heterarchic model of good governance 
and foresees its trends in the future. This model is already present in the army 
and in some companies and it can – without denying the hierarchic forms – en-
hance the range of communications without reducing supervision and accounta-
bility. However, contrary to their enlargement, it introduces a path to more tran-
sparent and democratic public institutions. The model also relates to the classic, 
hierarchic, big, and legally oriented public administration, so changes will not 
come to the fore in a short period. Countries can enable public deliberation with 
the institutional transformations of their public institutions into the heterarchic 
ones. The heterarchic administration can bring public decisions closer to the 
people who can, as their (in)formal contributor, give more relevant information 
and more predictable outcomes. 
Keywords: governance, heterarchy, lego style of public administration, visible 
public participation
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HETERARHIČNI MODEL DOBROG UPRAVLJANJA: 
STJECIŠTE PRILAGODLJIVOSTI, RAZLIKA, SLIČNOSTI, 
DEMOKRACIJE I ODGOVORNOSTI
Sažetak
Rad analizira osnovne elemente heterarhičnog modela dobrog upravljanja i 
predviđa trendove razvoja u budućnosti. Ovaj je model već prisutan u vojsci i u 
nekim tvrtkama te može – bez nijekanja hijerarhičnih oblika – povećati opseg 
komunikacija a da ne smanjuje obujam nadzora i odgovornosti. Njihovu po-
većanju unatoč, ovaj model utire put transparentnijim i demokratskijim javnim 
institucijama. Model je podoban i za klasičnu, hijerarhijsku, veliku i pravno 
orijentiranu javnu upravu, no tamo promjene neće doći do izražaja u kratko-
me roku. Države mogu omogućiti javno odlučivanje uz pomoć institucionalne 
transformacije svojih javnih institucija u heterarhične organizacije. Heterarhič-
na uprava donosi javne odluke bliže građanima koji, kao (ne)formalni akteri, 
mogu dati relevantnije podatke i osigurati predvidljivije rezultate.
Ključne riječi: vladavina, heterarhija, lego stil jave uprave, vidljiva participa-
cija javnosti
